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The study of law and economics was built up on two pillars. The first is the
familiar assumption of individual rationality. The second, less familiar, is the
principle of methodological individualism. Over the last twenty years, law and
economics has largely internalized behavioral critiques of the rationality
assumption. By contrast, the field has failed to appreciate the implications of
growing challenges to its methodological individualism. Where social norms
shape individual choices, network externalities are strong, coordination is the
operative goal, or information is a substantial determinant of value, a
methodology strongly oriented to the analysis of individuals overlooks at least
as much as it reveals. Among other potential distortions, indicia of consent
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may be given greater weight than they deserve, the evolution of law and norms
may be underemphasized, and our regulation of information, knowledge, and
even the financial markets may be flawed. As with the shift toward a more
careful approach to rationality, then, attention to the limits of methodological
individualism may lead us to a richer account of law and economics.
It is a touchstone of accepted economics that all explanations must run in
terms of the actions and reactions of individuals. Our behavior in judging
economic research, in peer review of papers and research, and in
promotions, includes the criterion that in principle the behavior we
explain and the policies we propose are explicable in terms of individuals,
not of other social categories. I want to argue today that a close
examination of even the most standard economic analysis shows that
social categories are in fact used in economic analysis all the time and
that they appear to be absolute necessities of the analysis, not just figures
of speech that can be eliminated if need be.
- Kenneth J. Arrow'
INTRODUCTION
At the foundation of the neoclassical economics on which law and
economics is built, two elements have been seen as essential: first, the
assumption of rationality, and second, the mandate of methodological
individualism. 2  Together, these generate the classic construct of homo
economicus - the rational actor paradigm that Holmes advanced in law, with
his emphasis on the "bad man" as the appropriate focus of legal analysis.
3
Since Herbert Simon's influential work on "bounded rationality," however,
the assumption of rationality has been under siege. 4 Experimental studies by
both economists and psychologists have revealed systematic deviations from
rationality across a wide array of settings. 5 In the works of On Amir, Christine
Jolls, Russell Korobkin, Don Langevoort, Orly Lobel, Cass Sunstein, Tom
Ulen, and others, in turn, these findings have been applied in the legal
' Kenneth J. Arrow, Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge, 84 AM. ECON.
REv. 1, 1 (1994).
2 See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 537, 539 (1998).
3 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,459 (1897).
4 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99
(1955).
5 See, e.g., Werner Guth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 385 (1982) (using ultimatum bargaining games to show that
"efficiency does not hold in general"); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974) (describing how
heuristics and biases affect the ability to make rational judgments).
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literature - generating the vibrant sub-discipline of behavioral law and
economics.6 This healthy dialectic of thesis, counterthesis, and synthesis in
law and economics' treatment of rationality stands in contrast, however, with
its less thoughtful approach to methodological individualism.
Given the origins of their discipline, if nothing else, scholars of law and
economics tend to see themselves as methodological individualists. 7 General
descriptions of law and economics are to similar effect, in their reference to
methodological individualism as a basic principle of the discipline.8 Arguably,
in fact, methodological individualism is even more foundational to law and
economics than the rationality assumption, serving as a kind of framing
constraint, rather than simply an assumption.9
As often as not, however, invocations of the mantra of methodological
individualism leave the author's intended meaning unclear.10  Where a
definition is offered, meanwhile, one finds striking variation among authors -
including the common assertion of definitions that are simply wrong. Beyond
such definitional ambiguity lies a more fundamental challenge. While law and
economics' orientation to the analysis of individuals is not faced with the kind
6 See, e.g., On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics
Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2109-10 (2008); Christine Jolls, Cass
R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1473 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1051, 1053 (2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1501 (1998)
(indicating that work by many researchers has "suggested that there are heuristics, biases
and other departures from rational decision-making processes").
See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 2, at 539.
See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Law, Economics, and Post-Realist Explanation, 24 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 1217, 1244 (1990) ("Even the most superficially functional economic
analysts of law ultimately adopt a methodological individualist research program."); Fred S.
McChesney, Positive Economics and All That, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 272, 295 (1992)
(reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991)).
9 See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Meanings of Methodological Individualism, 14 J. ECON.
METHODOLOGY 211, 211 (2007) ("[I]n so far as economists make their philosophical
assumptions explicit, claims to adhere to 'methodological individualism' are uppermost.");
see also Patrick B. Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency/Equity Dichotomy in Tax Policy
Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV. 501, 506-07 (1997) ("The desire to create an objective, scientific
basis for the social good is captured in the paramount methodological principle of positivist
economics: methodological individualism.").
0 See Hodgson, supra note 9, at 212; Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42
DUKE L.J. 53, 58 (1992). Not uncommonly, the dictates of methodological individualism
have been equated with the distinct demands of the rationality assumption. No less an
authority on methodological individualism than Jon Elster leaves the nexus between the two
somewhat unclear. See JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 22 (1989)
(illustrating the concept of rationality with examples of individual choice).
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of frontal assault that behavioral psychology and economics advanced against
the rationality assumption, it is increasingly under pressure as well.
As with critiques of the rationality assumption, much of this challenge
comes from within. My emphasis in what follows, as such, is not a
sociological preference for methodological holism - an orientation to races,
classes, and the like." Rather, I advance the more challenging claim that
strands of the economics literature itse/f undercut the individualistic orientation
of law and economics.
Notwithstanding the attention given many of these critical strands -
including social norms, network externalities, and coordination games - in the
legal literature, their conflict with methodological individualism has gone
largely unacknowledged. Law and economics scholars have thus failed to
appreciate the tensions between these observations and the continued practice
of methodological individualism. 12
The issue, as such, is not simply one of labeling. It is not that students of
law and economics call themselves methodological individualists when they
are not - although that is surely true in some cases? 3 The concern herein,
rather, is the law and economics literature's persistent emphasis on the
individual - its continued attempt to practice methodological individualism -
even in settings in which that approach is inadequate.
The uncritical invocation of methodological individualism as a foundational
principle of law and economics proves to be of real consequence for legal
analysis. As I suggest below, it may - among other potential harms - distort
legal doctrine in environmental regulation, takings law, and elsewhere;
encourage reliance on flawed indicia of consent; and generate inadequate or
inappropriate regulation in areas where knowledge or information are
important determinants of value. The methodological individualism of law and
11 See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 542.
12 Thus, the analysis herein holds implications for a wide array of legal scholarship. See,
e.g., Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing
as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 358 (2004) (describing a class of
"shareable goods" as an instance of the social phenomena at work in various markets); Lisa
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1725 (2001) (examining the "rules,
norms, and institutions" that regulate the cotton industry); Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757, 758 (1995) (questioning
the assumption that contracting parties reach socially optimal contractual arrangement that
affect neither other contracts nor the parties to other contracts); Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 479, 482-83
(1998) (examining the legal implications of network externalities).
13 "In the abstract, the principles of methodological individualism are widely accepted by
law and economics scholars. In practice, they are frequently honored in the breach."
Lawson, supra note 10, at 56; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based
Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 4, 33-34 (1994).
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economics may even help to explain some of our confusion as to how to
respond to the recent financial crisis.
14
The critique herein is not directed, as such, to a narrow group of traditional,
classical, or "Chicago-oriented" law and economics scholars. Rather, much of
the law and economics literature comes within its ambit.15 It is not that
scholars of law and economics do not recognize that groups exist, that
institutions have influence, or that social dynamics matter. To the contrary, the
literature has devoted substantial attention to questions of collectives, social
and group dynamics, and the like. These factors are commonly assigned a
narrow role in the analysis, however, helping to shape individual preferences,
but not serving as direct determinants of observed social outcomes. They are
not, as economist Geoffrey Hodgson has put it, made part of the explanation.
16
That, in fact, is the whole point of methodological individualism.
17
Consider, by way of example, the place of "community" in law and
economics. 8 In Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and
Economics, Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman forcefully challenged
conventional law and economics accounts of pollution externalities, collective
action, and takings. 19 Law and economics' traditional, individualistic approach
to these issues, they argued, could not explain what happened to the town of
Cheshire, Ohio, which the owner of a nearby power plant purchased in its
entirety. Only by integrating community into the analysis as well,
Parchomovsky and Siegelman counseled, could we properly understand the
dynamic at work. 20 For all the force of their argument, however, there was
simply no room for community within the entrenched methodological
individualism of law and economics. Even as law and economics scholars
have cited other strands of Parchomovsky and Siegelman's analysis, not once
14 See infra Part III.
15 Like Stephen Marglin, in his recent critique of his fellow economists' inattention to
community, "I have been urged to recognize the variety within economics by some
qualification such as 'mainstream' or 'standard' or 'neoclassical."' STEPHEN A. MARGLIN,
THE DISMAL SCIENCE: How THINKING LIKE AN ECONOMIST UNDERMINES COMMUNITY 5-6
(2008). I would echo his response, however, that "notwithstanding the variety, the
mainstream, in my view, is so dominant that the other streams have become mere trickles."
Id. at6.
16 See Hodgson, supra note 9, at 220-21.
17 Even Ludwig von Mises - among the founders of methodological individualism -
acknowledged that "collective wholes" matter. In his view, however, the only way to an
understanding of such wholes was through "an analysis of ... individuals' actions."
LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 42-43 (2d ed. 1963).
18 I return to this example infra Part III.A.
19 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and
Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 77 (2004).
20 Id. at 79.
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has their challenge to the discipline's individualistic focus been acknowledged,
let alone engaged.
2'
To begin to untie this Gordian Knot in the thinking of law and economics,
Part I describes ambiguities in the economic discourse of methodological
individualism, and suggests how we might understand its invocation in law and
economics. Part II highlights the ways in which a single-minded emphasis on
individuals constitutes a flawed approach to questions of great interest to legal
scholars, including social norms, network externalities, coordination games,
and aspects of information economics.
In each case, I suggest, a methodologically individualist approach leads law
and economics to overlook the dynamic of interdependence that is at work, and
thereby distorts both the normative and positive conclusions we derive. To
highlight as much, Part III reviews a handful of such distortions, including law
and economics' faulty equation of consent with efficiency, its inadequate
attention to evolution and change, and its flawed approach to the regulation of
knowledge and information and to the management of financial crises.
I. THE MEANING(S) OF METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM
Law and economics - a sub-discipline of neoclassical economics - stands
upon a pair of critical principles borrowed from the latter.22 As Robert
Ellickson succinctly puts it: "The core of [the law and economics] paradigm
was borrowed from economics. It consists of methodological individualism
(the assumption that individuals are the only agents of human action) and the
assumption that individuals are self-regarding and rational.
23
The limitations of the rationality assumption, of course, have been the
subject of a rich literature in recent decades. 24  Psychologists Daniel
21 A similar example might be the work of George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton on what
they have termed "identity economics." See, e.g., GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E.
KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: How OUR IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND
WELL-BEING 6 (2010); George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity,
115 Q.J. ECON. 715, 715 (2000). They have argued over the last decade that a proper
calculation of individual utility requires integration of relevant social categories, attendant
norms, and the potentially substantial consequences of conformity with (or deviation from)
those norms. Significant implications follow for the regulation of labor and employment,
corporate governance, discrimination law, and the financing of public and private education
- all issues of central importance in the study of law. With the exception of a handful of
relevant scholars, however, their work has gone unexplored in the law and economics
literature.
22 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 15-52 (1988); Ron
Harris, The Uses of History in Law and Economics, 4 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 659, 666 (2003).
23 Ellickson, supra note 2, at 539; see also Christian Kirchner, The Difficult Reception of
Law and Economics in Germany, 11 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 277, 283 (1991); McChesney,
supra note 8, at 295.
24 As careful commentators have highlighted, the rationality assumption - properly
understood - is far more modest than its critics would like to suggest. See Russell
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Kahneman and Amos Tversky, and economists including Herbert Simon,
jointly laid the foundations for this critique. 25 Legal scholars, however, have
since picked up - and significantly advanced - the ball of behavioral
analysis.26 Bald assertions of rationality are, as a result, far less common in the
law and economics literature than they used to be.
By contrast, the second principle borrowed from neoclassical economics -
methodological individualism - has been analyzed far less critically by
students of law and economics.27 In the sub-sections that follow, I begin with
a brief review of the historical origins of methodological individualism. I then
consider the tendency to insert questions of what ought to be and what is the
place of individuals into invocations of methodological individualism - a
concept properly understood to speak only to how we analyze relevant social,
economic, and political phenomena. I conclude by suggesting that those who
invoke methodological individualism may wish to have their cake and eat it
too - acknowledging, and even analyzing, social and institutional factors, but
inappropriately marginalizing their role in the analysis.
A. The Origins of Methodological Individualism
In its earliest origins, the term "methodological individualism" has been
traced to the work of Joseph Schumpeter, in 1908.28 As Schumpeter defined it,
however, its meaning was far narrower than what we commonly intend by it
today. Schumpeter's argument was simply that the economist "starts from the
individual in order to describe certain economic relationships. '29 He rejected,
by contrast, the practice of what he termed "sociological individualism" -
essentially what we have since embraced under the rubric of methodological
individualism. In this flawed analytical approach, "the self-governing
individual constitutes the ultimate unit of the social sciences; and ... all social
Korobkin, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behavioral
Economics, and Evolutionary Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 319, 321-22 (2001); Tanina
Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and
Economics Movement, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 973, 977 (2000).
25 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
26 See sources cited supra note 6.
27 Cf AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 21, at 113 (proposing to "modify and broaden
economic analysis to include identity").
28 See Joseph Schumpeter, On the Concept of Social Value, 23 Q.J. ECON. 213, 231
(1909) (citing JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, DAS WESEN UND DER HAUPTINHALT DER
THEORETISCHEN NATIONALOKONOMIE [THE NATURE AND ESSENCE OF ECONOMIC THEORY] 91
(1908)); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 33; Lars Udehn, The Changing Face of
Methodological Individualism, 28 ANN. REV. Soc. 479, 484 (2002).
29 Panayotis G. Michaelides & John G. Milios, Joseph Schumpeter and the German
Historical School, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 495, 502 n.3 (2009) (quoting SCHUMPETER,
supra note 28, at 91).
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phenomena resolve themselves into decisions and actions of individuals that
need not or cannot be further analyzed in terms of superindividual factors.
30
Before Schumpeter, notions of methodological individualism can likewise
be seen in the literature of the Austrian School of Economics - best known to
us through the work of Friedrich Hayek, but initially founded on Carl
Manger's "atomistic method" and Ludwig von Mises' additions thereto.
3 1
Mises thus cast the methods of economic analysis as exclusively
individualistic: "If we scrutinize the meaning of the various actions performed
by individuals we must necessarily learn everything about the actions of
collective wholes. 32
The intent of the Austrian School, however, was not to deny the importance
of institutions or to render groups irrelevant. Rather, the School hoped to more
fully and properly explain collective entities by way of individual actions.
Their project was, in a sense, a version of neoclassical economics' effort to
explain prices in purely individual terms. 33 Austrian economics ultimately
moved away from a rigid individualism, moreover, as in evident in the work of
Hayek himself. As he states in one of his later works:
The overall order of actions in a group is in two respects more than the
totality of regularities observable in the actions of the individuals and
cannot be wholly reduced to them. It is so not only in the trivial sense in
which the whole is more than the mere sum of its parts but presupposes
also that these elements are related to each other in a particular manner.
It is more also because the existence of those relations which are essential
for the existence of the whole cannot be accounted for wholly by the
interaction of the parts but only by their interaction with an outside world
both of the individual parts and the whole.
34
It was during the Twentieth Century, however, that the rhetoric of
methodological individualism became more widespread. 35 Standard use of the
term thus arose out of conflicts between economists and sociologists - defined
in significant part by their contrasting choice of method.36 While sociology
30 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 888 (1954).
31 See Udehn, supra note 28, at 484, 486. Other strands of the concept might be traced to
the work of Jeremy Bentham, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill, among other nineteenth
century sources. See id. at 480, 482.
32 MISES, supra note 17, at 42.
33 See Udehn, supra note 28, at 484.
34 F.A. HAYEK, Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct, in STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 66, 70-71 (1967); see also Marc Amstutz, Global
(Non-)Law: The Perspective of Evolutionary Jurisprudence, 9 GERMAN L.J. 465, 468-69
(2008); cf Christopher T. Wonnell, Contract Law and the Austrian School of Economics, 54
FORDHAM L. REv. 507, 523 (1986).
35 See Hodgson, supra note 9, at 212.
36 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an
Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 389, 392-93.
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thus embraced a methodological holism, in which collectives such as states,
ethnic groups, classes, and the like were anthropomorphized for purposes of
analysis, economics held itself out as the only true social science, by virtue of
its methodological individualism.
37
Economics thus came to be defined by the idea that the "individual is the
irreducible unit of positive economic analysis" - an approach in which
individual behaviors are the "only possible[] objects of social scientific
study. '38 As Kenneth Arrow succinctly puts it, "each individual makes
decisions to consume different commodities, to work at one job or another, to
choose production methods, to save, and to invest. '39  Methodological
individualists assume that these individual decisions, in turn, form "a complete
set of explanatory variables.
'40
In a methodologically individualist approach, thus, analysis of the social
must occur by way of the individual. 4 1 As Lars Udehn forcefully puts it in
reviewing our varied definitions of methodological individualism, "no
economic explanation is considered successful until all exogenous variables
have been reduced to psychological states of individuals and natural
constraints. Social institutions may appear in the models of neoclassical
economics, but only as endogenous variables.
'42
17 See id.
38 See Lawson, supra note 10, at 58, 59 (emphasis omitted); see also Dau-Schmnidt, supra
note 36, at 395 (asserting that the individual is the "dominant unit of analysis in
economics"). James Buchanan offers a characteristically strong statement of the principle:
"Those who prefer to conduct inquiry into the relationships among classes, states, and other
organizations as such, and without attempts to reduce analysis to the individuals who
participate, do not, in my view, pass muster as social scientists in any useful sense of the
term." JAMES M. BUCHANAN, EXPLORATIONS INTO CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 47 (1989).
19 Arrow, supra note 1, at 1.
40 Id. Beyond its core emphasis on the individual as the necessary unit of analysis,
methodological individualism is often also linked to two cognate principles: the
Schumpeterian conception of preference formation as exogenous to economic analysis, see
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 36, at 396, 401-02, and the notion of the subjectivity of
preferences, see Crawford, supra note 9, at 507-08 (describing the link between
methodological individualism and the prohibition on "interpersonal utility comparisons");
Herbert Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism and the Separation of Law
and Economics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 805, 841 (2000). I return to the implications of these
cognate principles infra Part I.C.
41 "Social phenomena should be explained in terms of individuals, their physical and
psychic states, actions, interaction, social situation and physical environment." Udehn,
supra note 28, at 499 fig.2; see also Crawford, supra note 9, at 507 ("The only way to a
cognition of collectives is the analysis of the conduct of its members." (quoting LUDWIG
VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 42 (Henry Regnery Co. 1966)
(1949))); cf Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place: Economics and
Phenomenology, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1713 (1998) ("[S]ocial structures arise from the
behavior of individual human beings and are best explained in terms of that behavior.").
42 Udehn, supra note 28, at 483.
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B. Individualism as Ought, Is, and How
Now common references to methodological individualism in both the
economics and the law and economics literatures, however, continue to leave a
great deal to the imagination.43 Most foundationally, there is significant
ambiguity as to relevant authors' intent to capture distinct normative,
ontological, and/or methodological claims. Even where reference is made to
methodological individualism, thus, other claims are often intended.
Quite commonly, to begin, assertions of methodological individualism turn
out to be grounded in some normative claim of individualism. In the work of
James Buchanan, Hayek, and others, much of the motivation behind an
individualistic method is the perceived need for robust individualism in the
design of a moral, sustainable, or efficient social order.44 In these cases, the
intertwining of "methodology and ideology" is by design. 45 At least as often,
however, such ambiguity may arise because the line between normative and
methodological claims is difficult to draw.
46
Ontological claims of individualism likewise stand behind many references
to methodological individualism. As Margaret Thatcher famously put it:
"There is no such thing as society .... There are individual men and women,
and there are families. ' 47 Here, the claim is still not one of method, but neither
is it normative. Instead, it is an ontological statement of the state of reality.
Individuals, the claim goes, are the basic units of the social and economic
order. As such, they are the necessary decision-makers and actors as to any
relevant question.
48
Methodological individualism, by contrast, requires no normative embrace
of individualism, nor even any ontological conclusion as to the actual place of
the individual in the social and economic order.49 Rather, it simply suggests
41 "[W]e are dealing with one of those plastic words which mean very different things to
different people; even for the same person, its meaning varies according to context. Indeed,
I would attribute much of the hold that individualism has on the modem mind to a confusion
of meanings." MARGLIN, supra note 15, at 58.
44 See Arrow, supra note 1, at 1. It bears emphasizing that nothing herein is inconsistent
with a strong normative commitment to individualism.
45 Id.
46 See id.; Hodgson, supra note 9, at 213.
47 THE COLLECTED SPEECHES OF MARGARET THATCHER 576 n. 1 (Robin Harris ed., 1997)
(quoting Interview by WOMAN'S OwN with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, United
Kingdom (Oct. 31, 1987)).
48 This meaning of "methodological" individualism may be what Elster famously
characterized as "trivially true." See ELSTER, supra note 10, at 13. It is likewise the concept
at work in Amartya Sen's embrace of individualism as "a manifest reality in the world."
AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 245 (2009). Some have also seen in Sen's capability
approach, however, an ethical or normative individualism. See Ingrid Robeyns, Sen's
Capability Approach and Feminist Concerns, in THE CAPABILITY APPROACH: CONCEPTS,
MEASURES AND APPLICATIONS (Flavio Comim et al. eds. 2008).
49 Because my emphasis herein is the use of individualism as method, I do not attempt to
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that as a matter of social scientific method, the correct approach to explanation
is to focus on the individual as the operative unit of analysis. Within this
approach, talk of collectives - groups, networks, communities, and the like -
has no place. It can largely be dismissed as loose talk. At very best, it might
serve to capture some aggregation of individual preferences and choices. As
Larry Summers has put it: "It is the basis of much economic analysis that the
good is an aggregation of many individuals' assessments of their own well-
being, and not something that can be assessed apart from individual judgments
on the basis of some overarching or separate theory." 50 For the methodological
individualist, then, explanation must be reduced to individuals. 5 1
The contribution of the foundational principle of methodological
individualism to law and economics, then, is properly understood to be about
method - not the various normative or ontological claims that are often
advanced in its shadow. Even after we recognize as much, however,
significant ambiguity remains as to what it means for law and economics to be
methodologically individualist.
C. Individuals and Institutions in Explanations
What does it mean, thus, to reduce explanations to individuals? In trying to
navigate this question, those who embrace methodological individualism wind
up between Scylla and Charybdis.52 As Geoffrey Hodgson suggests, two
possibilities would seem to present themselves: either explanations must be
reduced to individuals alone, or they must embrace individuals and their
interactions - essentially, individuals and institutions.
53
The first possibility is problematic on its face. As Hodgson points out,
meaningful explanation of social and economic phenomena is likely to be
impossible without some acknowledgement of interaction and institutions.
54
This would seem especially true of the legal analysis in law and economics.
offer a positive theory of the role of groups in social ordering. Among the seminal efforts in
that vein, however, is Sober and Wilson's work on group selection in evolutionary biology.
See ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND
PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR 4-7 (1998).
'o MARGLIN, supra note 15, at 63 (quoting Summers).
SI See Jon Elster, Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: The Case for
Methodological Individualism, 11 THEORY & Soc'Y 453, 453 (1982) (defining
methodological individualism as "the doctrine that all social phenomena (their structure and
their change) are in principle explicable only in terms of individuals - their properties,
goals, and beliefs"). Under this approach, "[t]he individual, along with his or her assumed
behavioral characteristics, is taken as the elemental building block in the theory of the social
or economic system." Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Hayek, Evolution, and Spontaneous Order, in
NATURAL IMAGES IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT: "MARKETS READ IN TOOTH AND CLAW" 408, 410
(Philip Mirowski ed., 1994).
52 See JOHN H. FINLEY, JR., HOMER'S ODYSSEY 131-38 (1978).
53 See Hodgson, supra note 9, at 215-16.
14 See id.
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Given the institutional orientation of law, the extreme reductionism of an
explanation grounded in individuals alone would seem entirely out of place.
The second possibility, on the other hand, would seem to concede too much.
If both individuals and their interactions - and hence social dynamics,
institutions, and the like - are part of the explanation, there is nothing
especially individualistic about the latter. We might equally cast the mandate
as methodological institutionalism, or at least as what Joseph Agassi has
termed "institutional individualism."
55
In responding to this dilemma, students of law and economics might be seen
as trying to have their cake and eat it too. Social factors - interactions and
resulting institutions - are acknowledged, and even analyzed, but they are
placed at the margins in the actual explanation of observed states of the
world. 56 By way of two cognate principles of methodological individualism,
thus, its practitioners have respectively sought to exogenize or endogenize
social and institutional factors. Either way, we get to the same result: these
factors wind up at the margins, rather than at the heart, of the analysis.
The first cognate principle of methodological individualism is thus the view
that the formation of preferences is exogenous to the analysis. 57 Given this
position, the role of social and institutional factors as determinants of
preferences can simply be put aside. Such questions are thereby placed beyond
the scope of standard economic - and hence law and economics - analysis.
58
As we will see, however, this approach often proves problematic. It is
unsustainable, for example, where the exogenized factors are so obviously
central that their absence renders the analysis vacuous.
Where the exogenization of social and institutional factors cannot be
sustained, a second principle of methodological individualism kicks in: the
subjectivity of preferences. 59 The latter, in practice, is simply another means to
the same end. According to the principle of subjective preferences, any
preference can be reconciled with rationality analysis, and hence must be
accepted within a methodologically individualist approach. Anything,
basically, can be endogenized into an individual's utility function. 60 This
second principle thus creates a kind of dumping ground for difficult or
15 See id. at 220-22; Udehn, supra note 28, at 489.
56 Such states are what I will refer to, in the context of Coleman's famous diagrams, as
the "social outcomes" of interest. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
" See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 36, at 396,401-02.
58 See supra note 41. In a sense, one might think of the question as one of what data to
consider. See Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 842-43. Methodological individualism looks
to a narrower set of data than I would suggest is appropriate for the meaningful analysis of
social norms, network externalities, and the other phenomena explored infra Part II.
59 See Crawford, supra note 9, at 507-08; Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 841.
60 See Udehn, supra note 28, at 500 ("[M]any economists cherish the dream of being able
to endogenize all institutions.").
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problematic elements of the analysis - including social and institutional factors
that might otherwise loom large in our evaluation.
61
By way of such endogenization, thus, the methodological individualist
effectively downgrades the place of social and institutional factors in her
analysis. Such elements are not part of the explanation; they are not evaluated
as causes. No longer, in this approach, are social and institutional factors
direct determinants of observed results. At best, they become indirect causes,
through their impact on the individual preferences that the analysis sees to
dictate our actual choices.
62
To appreciate what these twin principles exclude from the analysis, a
slightly modified depiction of the so-called Coleman diagram - which
sociologist James Coleman developed to suggest a middle ground between the
methodological individualism of economics and the methodological holism of
sociology - may be useful.
Social Structure (4) Social Outcomes
() (3)
Individual Preferences 1P Individual Action
(2)
Capturing the narrowest form of methodological individualism, Coleman's
framework depicts individual action as generated by individual values and
preferences (2), and grounds social outcomes in the actions of individuals (3).
It further recognizes the aforementioned endogenization of social and
institutional factors, in its linkage of individual values and preferences to social
structure (1).63
Beyond the foregoing, however, Coleman's schema also recognizes that
social structure not only shapes individual preferences, but likewise provides
the context and framework within which individual actions interact - and may
61 As with the attempt to exogenize social and institutional factors, endogenization of the
latter has its limits. Whenever we push too much into an individual's utility function, it
begins to look incoherent. See MARGLIN, supra note 15, at 65-66. This is particularly so,
however, when the relevant additions are of a social, institutional, or altruistic nature.
Individual utility thus looks a great deal less individual, when it consists of preferences that
are so explicitly social in their construction. Id.
62 If methodological individualists do consider social factors to be part of the
explanation, conversely, it becomes difficult to know what it means to be a methodological
individualist. At a minimum, the line between methodological individualism and holism
begins to seem quite blurred. See Udehn, supra note 28, at 500.
63 See id at 493-94.
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thus shape social outcomes more directly as well (4). Social structure "takes
the form of a set of interdependent positions that are prior to the interaction
between the individuals occupying these positions." 64 Contrary to the dictates
of methodological individualism, therefore, "talk about 'aggregation' is
misleading: 'for the phenomena to be explained involve interdependence of
individuals' actions, not merely aggregated individual behavior."'
65
Where it attempts to exogenize preference formation - whether by social
and institutional factors or otherwise - methodological individualism paints the
formation of individual preferences by social structures (i.e., the first axis) as
beyond the scope of relevant analysis. Where it endogenizes social and
institutional variables, in turn, it seeks to deny the direct effects - along the
fourth axis of Coleman's diagram - of social structure on social outcomes.
In a methodologically individualist approach, as a result, the constraints of
interest are not social and institutional ones. Rather, they are the more tangible
limits of budgets, income, and the like. As Dau-Schmidt notes, "when
economists talk about constrained choices they are focusing on how scarcity
and people's budgets affect their choices rather than how culture might
influence what people choose within the confines of their budget. '66 Contrast
this limited perspective with the more institutional approach described by Karl
Popper: "I propose to use the name 'social institution' for all those things
which set limits or create obstacles to our movements and actions almost as if
they were physical bodies or obstacles. Social institutions," he counseled, "are
experienced by us as almost literally forming part of the furniture of our
habitat."67
In the methodological individualism of law and economics, when culture -
as well as social dynamics and institutions more generally - appear, they do
not function as constraints of direct interest to the analysis, but at best, as
indirect influences on individual values and preferences. As we shall see,
however, this approach offers a poor window into important areas of legal and
economic analysis. In these areas, it is essential to go beyond an
individualistic focus, and engage the place of social and institutional factors as
direct causes, and not merely indirect influences, in the explanation of social
and economic phenomena.
4 Id. at 494. Akerlof and Kranton see "identity" in just this light. See AKERLOF &
KRANTON, supra note 21, at 10-11.
65 Udehn, supra note 28, at 494 (emphasis added) (quoting JAMES S. COLEMAN,
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 22 (1990)).
66 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 36, at 401 n.77.
67 KARL R. POPPER, THE MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK: IN DEFENCE OF SCIENCE AND
RATIONALITY 167 (M.A. Notturno ed., 1994). Akerlof and Kranton draw a further point of
distinction, which may be relevant here as well. They distinguish between "[g]arden-variety
tastes" - for apples versus oranges, for example - and identities and norms that derive from
one's social setting. See AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 21, at 6, 84.
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II. THE LIMITS OF METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM
[T]he foundational assumptions of economics . . . limit the ability of
economists to understand the parts of the world in which we must
perforce take an interest. An economist need not care about community,
but it is harder to avoid such issues as the determinants of saving and
investment, or the role of the distribution of income in assessing
economic outcomes, or even in addressing the question of why markets
are good for people. In all of these areas, the foundations of the discipline
not only undermine community; they undermine economic analysis.
- Stephen A. Marglin
68
The methodological individualism of the law and economics literature, as
we have seen, encourages a strong orientation to individuals as the focus of
explanation. While social dynamics and institutions are acknowledged, and
even analyzed, they are not evaluated as direct causes. At best, they may help
to explain individual preferences, which are emphasized as the operative
predictor of individual action and, in turn, of social outcomes.
In important areas of law and economics analysis, however, this approach
proves faulty - at least minimizing the insight we can gain, if not leading us
astray. Before turning to these areas, however, it is useful to acknowledge an
even broader tension between the economics literature today, and the
methodological individualism of law and economics.
Some conflict within methodological individualism might thus be found in
the very framework of modem economic analysis - general equilibrium theory.
Most commonly, equilibrium theory has been cast as the paradigmatic
expression of methodological individualism. Lars Udehn, for example, has
emphasized the strong individualistic rhetoric of Kenneth Arrow - the
preeminent economic theorist of equilibrium.
69
It is especially notable, thus, to recall Arrow's 1994 address to the American
Economic Association - a passage of which I highlighted at the outset.70 In
that address, Arrow challenged his fellow economists' persistent commitment
to methodological individualism, objecting that "every economic model one
can think of includes irreducibly social principles and concepts. ' 71 Contrary to
Udehn, moreover, Arrow argued that general equilibrium theory itself should
be understood as social in nature. Minimally, prices can be understood as
social because they are chosen on the market and not by individuals. More
broadly, the very concept of the market - particularly in its function as a
resource-allocation mechanism - might be cast as inconsistent with
6 MARGLIN, supra note 15, at 4.
69 See Udehn, supra note 28, at 482-83.
70 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
71 Arrow, supra note 1, at 2.
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methodological individualism: "Tastes may be socially caused; expectations
are influenced by others; firms are organizations," and the like.7
2
Beyond any such broad tension, however, it is useful to note a number of
areas in which a method that marginalizes social and institutional factors,
whether by their exogenization or their endogenization, is not likely to
generate meaningful insight. In this section, I highlight four areas in
particular: social norms, network externalities, coordination games, and
knowledge and information. Across each of these spheres, I ultimately




Perhaps the most important area of conflict with methodological
individualism in law and economics is the study of social norms. 74 In recent
years, social norms have been a subject of growing interest among students of
philosophy, psychology, sociology, economics, and law. In law and
economics, their study has been shaped by a characteristic methodological
individualism. 75 This hardly seems a natural fit, however, given social norms'
obvious emphasis on the social.
76
72 Id. at 4. The very discussion of externalities, Arrow suggests, might be seen to
conflict with the practice of methodological individualism. See id. at 5-6. Others have also
highlighted tensions between economic theory and methodological individualism, including
an inability to define "goods" absent some social construction, see Paul N. Cox, The Public,
The Private and the Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 391, 429-30 (1997), or even to engage
in the exercise of welfare economics, see Crawford, supra note 9, at 513.
13 Beyond the study of social norms, network externalities, coordination games, and
knowledge and information, other literatures may also conflict with a continued insistence
on methodological individualism. These potential conflicts include at least the historical
strand of institutional economics exemplified by the work of Douglass North, see, e.g.
Douglass North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 359, 360
(1994), if not also the transaction-cost strand of Oliver Williamson, see, e.g., Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22
J.L. & ECON 233, 233-34 (1979). Recent work in search theory and Elinor Ostrom's
analysis of common pool resources may also fall into this category, as might certain strands
of the social psychology and organizational theory literature.
74 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 123 (1991) (offering a theory "designed to illuminate in what social context and
with what content informal norms emerge to help people achieve order without law"); ERIC
A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 3 (2000); Bernstein, supra note 12, at 1725
(highlighting the role of norms within the cotton industry's private legal system).
71 See Susan D. Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 307, 319 (2005); Ellickson,
supra note 2, at 539. Methodological individualism characterizes even much of the non-
economic social norms literature. See, e.g., CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF
SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS 22 (2006).
76 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 2, at 343-44.
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The social norms literature has, to a significant degree, been oriented to the
role of social norms as substitutes for law. The operation of social norms,
however, involves a fundamentally different dynamic from that of law. While
students of social norms have identified a variety of ways in which social
norms might exert influence - from internalization to shaming and other
species of third-party enforcement - all share a common distinction with legal
enforcement: the efficacy of a social norm depends, at its foundation, on a
perception of it being embraced broadly. 77 A social norm is only so because it
is seen to be so.
7 8
As a consequence, community matters critically to social norms. The social
norms literature's various frameworks of norm compliance - from first-
through third-party accounts - all require some baseline community structure
out of which the given mechanism of compliance may arise. Some extant
social framework, as such, must precede the operation of social norms.
Given as much, a distinct emphasis on individualistic analysis is hard to
reconcile with the analysis of social norms. The whole discussion of social
norms goes to social and community dynamics. The interesting question is not
only why individuals comply with norms, but what causes norms to emerge, to
evolve, and to persist or be abandoned. Our attention in the study of social
norms thus seems most appropriately directed to the relevant social dynamics
themselves, and to the social conceptions they engender.
Social norms are further distinct from law in that social norms serve a
broader set of functions than the latter. In primary part, law serves to solve
collective action problems. As Edna Ullmann-Margalit points out, however,
social norms also do other, more social and community-oriented things.
79
Specifically, they may be important in addressing coordination problems, as
well as distributional and equity concerns. 80  Taking an individualistic
approach to social norms necessarily downplays these contributions.
Recent work of George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton on the need to factor
"identity" into economic analysis - to consider "the individual in the social
setting ' '81 - might also be cited in this regard, given their emphasis on norms.
82
77 See BICCHIERI, supra note 75.
78 The point is even clearer when one considers the related dynamic of convention. See
MARGLIN, supra note 15, at 148; see also DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDY 97 (1969); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 76 (1977).
79 See ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 78, at 134-37.
80 See id.
81 AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 21, at 28.
82 See id. at 18-20, 28; see also Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 21; George A. Akerlof &
Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and Schooling: Some Lessons for the Economics of Education,
40 J. ECON. LIT. 1167, 1167-68 (2002) (positing that school quality actually correlates to a
student's identity in relation to the school's social settings); George A. Akerlof & Rachel E.
Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organizations, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2005, at 9,
12 (describing an identity model that takes account of norms); George A. Akerlof & Rachel
E. Kranton, Identity, Supervision, and Work Groups, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 212, 212 (2008);
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Even as economists have come to engage more closely with the real world -
through their engagement with more realistic tastes, and subsequently through
the insights of behavioral economics - Akerlof and Kranton argue they have
continued to give inadequate attention to the social context and categories
within which individuals define their utility.8 3 To be useful, they counsel, any
attempt to specify individual utility must incorporate these categories and the
norms that follow from them.
84
It is hard to overstate the implications of this approach in important areas of
legal analysis, including labor and employment, education, discrimination, and
even corporate governance. Yet a strongly individualistic orientation
necessarily minimizes the place of social categories, identities, and resulting
norms in our analysis. While Akerlof and Kranton do not explicitly challenge
methodological individualism, their emphasis on identity stands in significant
tension with the persistent methodological individualism of law and
economics.
In sum, methodological individualism operates to marginalize social norms.
For many scholars of law and economics, social norms are functionally
irrelevant, given the exogeneity of preference formation.8 5 Methodological
individualism confines even those who attend to social norms, however, to an
approach in which norms are endogenized into individual utility functions.
8 6
As noted, this minimally reduces attention to other, at least equally important,
functions of social norms. More significantly, an individualistic approach to
social norms does not see them as constraints of the sort cognizable to law and
economics.8 7 Such an approach thus fails to engage norms' potential direct
causal effects - not simply their influence on individual preferences, but their
shaping of the architecture of choice within which those preferences play out
and interact.
88
George A. Akerlof, Social Distance and Social Decisions, 65 ECONOMETRICA 1005, 1005
(1997) (discussing "social distance" as a factor for understanding decision making, given
the fact that decisions are shaped by social factors and their effects on individuals); George
A. Akerlof, The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics, 97 AM. EcON. REV. 5, 6 (2007)
(criticizing prior economic doctrine for failure to consider norms of decision makers).
83 See AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 21, at 7.
14 Akerlof and Kranton offer an approach that still begins with individual tastes, but then
proceeds through a three-step process - associating individuals with relevant social
categories, specifying the prevailing norms within those categories, and then positing
individual gains and losses arising from particular decisions, given said categories and
norms- to integrate identity as well. See id. at 14, 17-18.
85 See supra Part I.C.
86 See id.
87 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
88 See supra Part I.C; cf RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEFIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONs ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3 (2008) (defining the concept of
"choice architecture").
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B. Network Externalities
Beyond social norms, so-called network externalities are similarly ill-suited
to individualistic analysis, and likewise familiar to law and economics
scholars. 89 Such effects arise where the utility of a good to a consumer
increases with its consumption by others.90 As to such network goods - the
telephone and fax machine being among the most obvious examples - network
size (i.e., the number of other users) very much matters.
91
Where network externalities are present, the analysis of individual utility
becomes difficult to separate out from the assessment of social utility. As with
social norms, consequently, a distinctly individualistic methodology is prone to
miss as much as it captures.
To appreciate as much, recall Joseph Schumpeter's original coining of the
term "methodological individualism.' '92 He concludes that:
Marginal utilities do not depend on what society as such has, but on what
individual members have. Nobody values bread according to the quantity
of it which is to be found in his country or in the world, but everybody
measures the utility of it according to the amount that he has himself, and
this in turn depends on his general means.
93
In network settings, however, individuals value a good precisely according to
"the quantity of it which is to be found in [their] country or in the world.
94
This point is obvious, of course, with regard to telephones, fax machines,
and similar technologies. But we can see it in a far broader range of
"networks" as well. Some network dynamic will often be present in efforts at
technological innovation, and even in economic growth generally, given
positive feedback loops arising from individual initiative in each regard.
95
Similarly, Parchomovsky and Siegelman highlight the importance of network-
type interactions in explaining the need for law and economics to attend to
community: "[E]ach resident in a community has a stake in the continued
presence of other members and simultaneously bestows a benefit on others by
his own presence. '96 Most broadly, one might cast human social existence
89 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition,
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 215, 223-26 (2004) (discussing network effects in securities markets);
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 1994, at 93, 105-06.
90 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 12, at 599.
9' See Ahdieh, supra note 89, at 223-26; Katz & Shapiro, supra note 89, at 105-06.
Thus, network externalities have occasionally been described as demand-side economies of
scale. See Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented
Standards, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 5 n.21 (2009).
92 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
93 Schumpeter, supra note 28, at 214.
94 Id.
95 See Arrow, supra note 1, at 7.
96 Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 19, at 114.
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generally as defined by network dynamics of a sort: "Human behavior is the
product of various factors that together make up a dynamic field, in the sense
that the state of any part of the field depends on every other part of the field., 97
This is not to suggest that Schumpeter was wrong to suggest the absence of
"social utility" in the abstract.98 Nor does this approach dictate an embrace of
sociology's methodological holism, an approach in which social masses -
classes, races, and the like - are analyzed as determinative actors. 99 It simply
suggests that we cannot ignore collective - and interdependent - determinants
of individual utility if we are to meaningfully engage questions of individual
utility in network settings. The methodological individualism referenced by
Schumpeter is necessarily less useful, then, where his baseline assumptions
about individual utility functions do not hold true.100
With network externalities, as with social norms, one can see how
methodological individualism's desire to endogenize social and institutional
factors avoids the critique I offer. One might justify a methodologically
individualistic approach in network settings, thus, by characterizing network
externalities as simply inputs into the utility functions of relevant individuals.
In the presence of network effects, a methodologically individualist approach
sees network externalities, such as the consumption patterns of others, or
predictions about future consumption, as factors to be endogenized into
individual utility functions along with more standard inputs, including relevant
individual tastes and preferences.
This response, however, is equally complete and unsatisfying. Such an
account stretches the confines of individual utility too far, essentially equating
individual utility with social utility where network externalities are present. To
so completely socialize individual utility, however, undermines the exercise.
Recall that the question herein is one of method. What analytical approach
will yield the greatest insight? Given the distortion attendant to a wholesale
endogenization of network externalities - or social norms - into individual
utility functions, it seems unlikely to constitute an ideal methodological
approach.101
C. Coordination Games
As with the study of social norms and network externalities, the growing
interest of law and economics in coordination games is difficult to reconcile
with a strongly individualistic approach. 10 2 Viewed broadly, one might see
" Rostain, supra note 24, at 987.
98 See Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 33 (identifying this suggestion in Schumpeter's
views).
9' See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
100 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the
Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REv. 578, 580-81 (2010); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and
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tension between the prescriptions of methodological individualism and game
theory analysis generally. Game theory is often cast as classically
methodologically individualist, given its emphasis on individual strategy
choices. 10 3 The rules of any given game, however, are necessarily social in
nature. 104 Individuals must define and agree on the rules collectively.
Whatever the limits of a methodologically individualistic approach to game
theory generally, these are particularly acute in so-called "coordination
games." As Richard McAdams has highlighted, legal scholars' fascination
with the Prisoner's Dilemma dwarfs their attention to other strands of game
theory, including the important realm of coordination games.10 5 As McAdams
compellingly demonstrates, however, coordination game dynamics are at least
as applicable in areas of interest to legal scholars - from bargaining and
international law, to standard-setting and property law.1
0 6
In these coordination settings, participants' critical aim is to coordinate their
behavior. Each player's choice of strategy thus depends on the choice made by
her counterparts. If you are going to go to one potential location, I will go
there as well, and vice-versa if you go to the other. Whatever preference I may
have between the choices, it is dwarfed by the payoffs attendant to getting to
the same place - i.e., to coordinating our strategies.
107
This is not to suggest that conflict is absent in coordination settings. The
famous game of Chicken, in which two cars race toward each other to see who
will swerve first, is a classic, if highly conflictual, coordination game. 10 8
Rather than a lack of conflict, thus, the critical feature of coordination games -
in contrast to Prisoner's Dilemma games - is that the parties lack a dominant
strategy: a strategy they will play regardless of the strategy chosen by their
Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form
Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1586 (1998); Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners'
Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 211 (2009).
103 See Arrow, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also SHAUN P. HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS
VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 33 (1995) (describing potential for
the origin of structures to be obscured in game theory, given its distinctive attempt to
separate out choice and structure); Udehn, supra note 28, at 483. Evolutionary game theory
is not to the contrary, given its emphasis on strategic choice rather than "changes in the rules
of the game." See Arrow, supra note 1, at 3.
104 See Arrow, supra note 1, at 4-5; Udehn, supra note 28, at 495.
105 McAdams, supra note 102, at 216.
106 See id. at 236-54.
107 See Ahdieh, supra note 89, at 233-38.
108 The most familiar reference for the game of Chicken may be the dramatic scene in
Rebel Without a Cause, when Jim (played by James Dean) and Buzz race toward a
precipice. Buzz "wins" the game, but only by going off the cliff with his car. REBEL
WITHOUT A CAUSE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1955). A more recent example of Chicken on the
big screen occurred in the Kevin Bacon classic, Footloose, when Bacon's character and his
nemesis faced each other down on tractors. FOOTLOOSE (Paramount Pictures 1984).
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counterpart. 10 9 Instead, their strategies are interdependent, such that each
one's choice depends on the other's. 110
Because of this interdependence, there are "multiple equilibria" in
coordination games: more than one set of choices from which neither player
will deviate, absent a change in strategy by their counterpart as well. As a
result, the solution to coordination games - and hence the determination and
prediction of relevant social outcomes - does not lie in any single individual
alone. An individualistic mode of analysis tells us little. Rather, as Richard
McAdams points out, history and culture - the institutional context in which
individual choices are made - are essential to effective analysis in coordination
settings. 1 I
That economists and scholars of law and economics have tended to resist the
identification of such multiple equilibrium dynamics should consequently
come as little surprise. The presence of multiple equilibria conflicts directly
with an insistence on methodological individualism as the sine qua non of true
social science.1 2  In multiple equilibrium settings, methodological
individualism falls short.
This conflict highlights an even deeper tension between multiple equilibria
and the self-identification of economics, as well as law and economics, as
positive sciences directed to the project of prediction.113 Such prediction
becomes all but impossible once we accept the necessary role of social and
institutional factors in multiple equilibrium settings. 1 4 As two students of
game theory have summarized it:
[T]he recurring difficulty with the analysis of many games is that there
are too many potential plausible outcomes [i.e., multiple equilibria, in
game theoretic language]. There are a variety of disparate outcomes
which are consistent with (Humean) individuals qua individuals
interacting. Which one of a set of potential outcomes should we expect to
materialise? We simply do not know. Such pluralism might seem a
strength. On the other hand, however, it may be taken to signify that the
109 See Adrian Vermeule, Foreword.- System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 49 (2009).
110 One might see the collective dynamic in shareholders' response to tender offers as
suggestive of this pattern. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 19, at 119-20 (citing
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate
Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1696 (1985)).
See McAdams, supra note 102, at 231-33.
112 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
113 See ELLICKSON, supra note 74, at 158; cf MARGLIN, supra note 15, at 9 ("Economics
takes very much to heart the famous dictum of the nineteenth-century physicist Lord Kelvin
that we know only what we can measure. Indeed, economics takes the dictum a step further,
from epistemology to ontology: what we can't measure - entities like community - doesn't
exist." (citation omitted)).
1"4 See Rostain, supra note 24, at 986-87.
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selection of one historical outcome is not simply a matter of
instrumentally rational individuals interacting. There must be something
more to it outside the individuals 'preferences, their constraints and their
capacity to maximise utility. The question is: what?' 
15
Economics, as well as law and economics, thus cease to be readily predictive
in the presence of multiple equilibria. Minimally, the task of prediction
becomes a far more complex exercise, given the social and institutional factors
at work.
1 6
An insistence on methodological individualism avoids these difficulties, of
course, but at the cost of meaningful insight. The avoidance of uncertainty by
an insistent focus on the individual thus condemns us to mistake or
mischaracterize what is happening in important - and perhaps increasingly
important - coordination settings. 17 We do better, then, to put aside our rigid
methodological individualism and embrace the uncertainty attendant to the
presence of multiple equilibria, given the important windows it can open up. 1 8
This is especially crucial given that the multiple equilibria and attendant
uncertainty that arise in coordination settings are not limited to those
circumstances. They are far more common phenomena, thus, than economists
and scholars of law and economics have been willing to admit. Multiple
equilibria may even characterize general equilibrium theory itself 11 9  A
distinctly individualistic orientation to law and economics, as a result, may be
highly misleading.
D. Knowledge and Information
The necessarily social dimensions of the analysis of coordination games
suggest a fourth area of legal and economic analysis ill-suited to a
methodologically individualist approach: the study of knowledge and
information. 2 0 Ultimately, the solution to coordination games lies in players'
possession of a certain "common knowledge" - some shared set of priors about
115 HARGREAVES HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 103, at 33 (emphasis added).
116 Rostain, supra note 24, at 986-87 (citations omitted).
117 Parchomovsky's and Siegelman's analysis is a case in point. See supra notes 18-20
and accompanying text. I suggest others in Ahdieh, supra note 102, at 580-81.
118 See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1817-
19 (2000).
119 See Alan Kirman, The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory: The Emperor
Has No Clothes, 99 ECON. J. 126, 127 (1989).
120 See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information Overload: Toward the
Privileging of Categorizers, 60 VAND. L. REV. 135, 140 (2007) (arguing that copyright law
should look beyond individual infractions to the negative externalities created by copyright
infringers); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous
Personal Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1667, 1671 (2008) (suggesting that information
about individuals will impact interactions); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the
Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 461 (2002).
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the world, its occupants, and their likely behavior.'21 It is through such
common knowledge that players develop accurate expectations of one another,
and thus coordinate their behavior successfully. 122 By definition, however,
such common knowledge is necessarily social in nature. 123 An analysis of it
oriented to individuals is therefore likely to be uninteresting, if not misleading.
Beyond the question of common knowledge in coordination settings, one
can see the limits of an individualistic approach to knowledge and information
in the aspiration to reduce uncertainty more generally. Ignorance - a lack of
relevant information - can be addressed by way of "algorithmic knowledge":
"the knowledge of a calculating, maximizing homo economicus.'' 124 To
overcome ignorance, thus, we need simply to find and/or provide missing
information. To address uncertainty, by contrast, algorithmic knowledge will
not suffice. What is needed, instead, is experiential knowledge. 125 As Stephen
Marglin has suggested, "coping with uncertainty is... predominantly a matter
of experiential knowledge, and will remain so no matter how adept at climbing
decision trees or manipulating subjective probabilities we might become."
26
Experiential knowledge, however, is rooted in community. The transfer of
knowledge by experience turns on the presence of relevant associations and the
necessary context for transfer. 127  The engagement of uncertainty, then,
requires a social analysis.
The rise of prediction markets, as well as the related dynamic of efficient
capital markets, can be understood in this light.128  These concrete
manifestations of the so-called "wisdom of crowds"'129 recognize the
121 See Ahdieh, supra note 89, at 256-57; Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power
of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1064 n.73 (citing MICHAEL S. CHWE,
RATIONAL RITUAL 25-26 (2001)).
122 See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
123 As Arrow points out, "common pools of knowledge" are inherently social in nature.
See Arrow, supra note 1, at 1-2; see also MARGLIN, supra note 15, at 147.
124 See MARGLIN, supra note 15, at 128.
125 See id. at 148.
126 Id. at 146-47.
127 See id. at 147; cf Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 101, 137 (1997)
128 See, e.g., MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISION MAKING ix-xv (2007); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How
MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 132-33 (2006); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 552 (1984); Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving?" For Everyone (And Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1699, 1702 (2006) (exploring "the use of information aggregation technologies to
deter, detect, and punish citizen misconduct").
29 See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER
THAN THE FEW AND How COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES,
AND NATIONS xiii-xiv (2004).
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necessarily collective nature of efforts to grapple with uncertainty. The
dynamic in such settings is emphatically not individual. To the contrary, it
reflects the nature of groups as more than the sum of their parts.
Ultimately, however, we can cast the limits of a methodologically
individualist approach to knowledge and information even more broadly.
Recall, once again, the striking dismissal of methodological individualism by
Kenneth Arrow: "[E]very economic model one can think of includes
irreducibly social principles and concepts.' 30 The prime example of the
necessarily social dimension of economic analysis that Arrow highlighted, it
turns out, is knowledge and information. As he suggests, "the importance of
technical information in the economy is an especially significant case of an
irreducibly social category in the explanatory apparatus of economics."' 3'
Broadly, the transfer of knowledge is not individualistic. Rather, as Arrow
quotes Thorstein Veblen, "[t]he commonplace knowledge of ways and means,
the accumulated experience of mankind, is still transmitted in and by the body
of the community at large."' 132 The same is true of the creation of new
knowledge, to which Arrow suggests economists have not been sufficiently
attentive, given its centrality to economic growth. 133 As with the transfer of
existing knowledge, the acquisition of new knowledge is, in primary part,
social in nature. 134 An individualistic approach to knowledge would thus seem
ill-advised.
E. Individualism and Interdependence in Economic Analysis
Behind the dynamics at work in each of the areas above - social norms,
network externalities, coordination games, and knowledge and information -
lies a common strand of interdependence. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt has
highlighted the importance of this feature: "[I]t would seem important to take
account of the fact that people are not always independent actors, but are
members of groups, and that such membership can sometimes affect their
actions. This fact seems particularly relevant in analysis of the regulation of
group-based activity such as racial discrimination."'' 35 In essence, the claim
herein is that the breadth of such "group-based activity" is broader than we
130 Arrow, supra note 1, at 2.
'3' Id. at 1. Arrow thus identifies "socially held technical knowledge as a main
determinant of economic activity in every economy." Id at 6 (citing Thorstein Veblen,
Professor Clark's Economics, 22 Q.J. ECON. 147 (1908), reprinted in THE PLACE OF SCIENCE
IN MODERN CIVILISATION AND OTHER ESSAYS 180-230 (1919)). This conclusion is
increasingly true with each passing day. Modem industrialized economies are thus defined
more and more by firms whose value lies in their information advantages. See id. at 8.
132 Id. at 6 (quoting Veblen, supra note 131, at 186).
13 See id. at 6-7.
13 See id at 7. Ultimately, we might plausibly think of information as itself breeding
information, with the centrality of an individualistic analysis necessarily reduced. See id.
13 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 36, at 419.
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have commonly assumed. Properly understood, the dynamics at work in the
presence of social norms, in the operation of network externalities, in
coordination game settings, and in the creation and transfer of knowledge and
information, all come within this sphere. The critical question in evaluating
the effectiveness of a methodologically individualist approach consequently
becomes the relative importance of such interdependence in understanding a
given social or economic setting.
As Lynne Dallas posits: "To the socioeconomist, interdependencies are part
of the human condition .... Interdependencies exist throughout the economy.
•...136 Law and economics analysis largely overlooks such interdependency,
however, by way of its methodological individualism. Stephen Marglin thus
points to his fellow economists' preference for "a narrow definition of self-
interest - one in which self-interest is a focus on one's own self, where my
perception of how I ought to act, how I ought to be, is completely independent
of what anybody else in society is consuming or doing."'137 Why the
preference for this approach? Because "a focus on the self eliminates the web
of interconnections associated with a broader notion of self-interest; that is, a
narrow notion of self-interest eliminates a whole class of externalities that
might rob markets of their Pareto optimal properties."
' 138
It bears emphasizing, however, that the interdependency at work in the areas
considered above is not one of some vague, sentimental sort. Rather, what we
find in the presence of social norms, network externalities, and the like is what
we might more formally characterize as a correlation across individual utilities
- what Alan Kirman describes as similar, even collective, demand. 139 The
relevant dynamic is one of positive feedback effects, in which the strategic
choices and consumption pattems of any given individual pull others in a
similar - or at least in some particular - direction. 140 Given as much, an
individualistic methodology must necessarily prove more limited in
understanding such situations.
An understanding of interdependence as highlighting the category of
settings in which law and economics' reliance on methodological
individualism is flawed also helps to emphasize the distinction between the
present argument and more familiar behavioral critiques of law and economics.
136 Lynne L. Dallas, Law and Socioeconomics in Legal Education, 55 RUTGERS L. REV.
855, 859 (2003).
137 MARGLIN, supra note 15, at 66.
138 Id. In a similar vein, see Akerlof and Kranton's discussion of the derivation of certain
tastes from social context and identity. AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 21, at 32-33.
139 See Kirman, supra note 119, at 138.
140 In other terms, the settings reviewed above are characterized by "increasing returns,"
including learning effects, coordination dynamics, and self-reinforcing adaptive
expectations. See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE
ECONOMY 112 (1994); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 94-97 (1990).
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Here, the critical question is not one of individual rationality or irrationality.
Rather, it is the impact of individual choices - rational or otherwise - on
others. Kirman captures as much in contrasting the behavioral work of Herbert
Simon with his own critique of individualism in economic analysis:
Yet it should be noted that provided the basic model is one in which
individuals react in the same continuous way to signals (prices) [Simon's
account] is formally equivalent to the Arrow-Debreu model. Indeed, as
will be shown below, unless it could be proved that individual behaviour
of the type invoked by Simon imposes restrictions on the collective
behaviour because it leads people to behave similarly, we are no further
advanced. 141
A critique of methodological individualism - and the attendant inattention to
interdependence - in economics and law thus goes to the foundations of
neoclassical economics and the law and economics built on it, even more so
than behavioral critiques.
The argument herein endorses neither the view of classical law and
economics that widespread individual rationality drowns out isolated cases of
irrationality, nor the view of behavioral law and economics that widespread
irrationality drowns out isolated cases of rationality. Rather, the point it seeks
to emphasize is the presence of more systematic determinants of- and
resulting continuities in - individual behavior than either approach ordinarily
acknowledges. My argument thus highlights the need for a more contextual
approach, in which individual preferences and utility functions are
determinative in some cases - and hence the appropriate methodological focus
- while group factors are the necessary determinant in others. In any given
case, we must ask, how much does the relevant social context, institutional
setting, and resulting interdependence matter in the shaping of individual
action and social outcomes?
1 42
Ultimately, then, "[t]he idea that we should start at the level of the isolated
individual is one which we may well have to abandon."' 143 The rote invocation
and practice of methodological individualism in law and economics is
unwarranted. Just as traditional assertions of rationality produced less
nuanced, less accurate, and less interesting accounts of law and economics, a
141 Kirman, supra note 119, at 127.
142 As Kirman aptly concludes:
If we look back briefly to the result that underlies the whole problem expressed here it
is clear that in the standard framework we have too much freedom in constructing
individuals. The basic artifact employed is to find individuals each of whose demand
behaviour is completely independent of the others. This independence of individuals'
behaviour plays an essential role in the construction of economies generating arbitrary
excess demand functions. As soon as it is removed the class of functions that can be
generated is limited. Thus making individual behaviour dependent or similar may
open the way to obtaining meaningful restrictions.
Id. at 137-38.
141 Id. at 138.
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conceptualization of individuals as the necessary focus of study in law and
economics, including even in the evaluation of social norms, network
externalities, coordination, knowledge and information, and other settings of
interdependence, has the potential to greatly distort our analysis. In fact, as we
will see in the following section, it often does just that.
144
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM
A methodologically individualist approach is ill-advised with regard to
important aspects of legal and economic analysis. Minimally, these include the
study of social norms, network externalities, coordination games, and
knowledge and information. More broadly, one might consider settings
characterized by multiple equilibria, by uncertainty, and by interdependence as
ill-suited to an individualistic approach. At the extreme, one might even see
analysis of the market, price formation, and equilibrium generally to conflict
with a strongly individualistic orientation. What, then, are the consequences of
the continued practice of methodological individualism in law and economics?
I have already hinted at some of the ways in which the methodological
individualism of law and economics distorts our analysis. The tendency of
social norms scholars to focus on their role as substitutes for law might be
traced to this approach.1 45 The commitment to methodological individualism
may likewise help explain legal scholars' relative inattention to coordination
games, by comparison with the Prisoner's Dilemma.
1 46
Closer examination of a handful of additional consequences of law and
economics' persistent methodological individualism, however, may help to
highlight the importance of the analysis herein. The ensuing discussion, of
questions of consent, the study of evolution and change, and the regulation of
information and financial markets, is far from an exclusive enumeration of the
ways in which methodological individualism may distort our understanding of
law and economics. Other implications might be cited as well. It is
suggestive, however, of why it is crucial that we be more attentive to our
practice of methodological individualism, and more selective in its use.
A. Community and Consent
To appreciate the consequences of the methodological individualism of the
law and economics literature, one might begin with Gideon Parchomovsky and
Peter Siegelman's article, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in
Law and Economics, which analyzes the purchase of nearly the entire town of
14 Again, it bears emphasizing that the critique herein is directed exclusively to the
question of method, to which methodological individualism is properly understood to speak,
and not to the normative or ontological claims that are often attached to it. See supra Part
I.B. In the settings described in the section just concluded, I argue, an individual-oriented
approach to the analysis is ill-advised.
145 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
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Cheshire, Ohio by American Electric Power Company, given the company's
ongoing environmental degradation of the town. 147  In the standard,
individualistic account of such pollution externalities in the law and economics
literature, they point out, such a buyout should have been difficult (if not
impossible) to accomplish, given attendant transaction costs, as well as
individual incentives to hold out. 148  Yet the deal proceeded with little
difficulty, and no evidence of holdouts.
In seeking to explain as much, Parchomovsky and Siegelman critique the
traditional analysis of pollution externalities from a purely individualistic
perspective. This approach, they argue, causes us to miss much of what is
really going on:
Although the economic analysis of pollution has been enormously
influential, in terms of both theory and policy, the analysis has been
conducted entirely from a perspective of methodological individualism.
That is, law and economics scholars see victims in pollution disputes as
acting independently of each other, with no interdependencies and no
sense of social embeddedness. Although we acknowledge that the ...
assumption of atomistic individualism can be powerful and productive in
many cases, we argue that it is a highly incomplete description of human
behavior, one that can be misleading in some important settings. 
149
It is critical, Parchomovsky and Siegelman argue, for law and economics
scholars to likewise attend to "community" - which they characterize in terms
echoing the analysis herein. 50  There was, they suggest, a "strong
interdependence among the utility functions of residents of the village."' 5'
Residents shared "an interest in a common asset."' 5 2 Community thus emerges
as "a kind of positive externality that can exercise a profound effect on the
outcomes of economic transactions."
' 53
Disregarding the latter, the traditional, methodologically individualistic
approach of law and economics "misses the essential jointness of decision
making in environments characterized by strong interpersonal ties."' 54 Once
we allow ourselves to recognize the collective dynamic at work, by contrast, it
proves fairly easy to buy out an entire town. It may even be too easy, in
Parchomovsky and Siegelman's view. 155 Jurisprudential adjustments in the
regulation of such buyouts thus become necessary, including a distinct
147 See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 19, at 78.
141 Id. at 78-80.
149 Id. at 78 (citation omitted).
15o See id. at 79.
151 See id at 82.
152 See id. at 79.
"I Id. at 81.
154 Id. at 98.
155 See id. at 82 (suggesting that "an offer to buy out some residents may cause the
community to unravel, thus forcing all remaining home owners to sell").
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approach to evaluating the propriety of injunctive relief and greater care in
assessing the possibility of under-compensation.
156
Implications also follow for other areas of legal and economic analysis,
including the dynamics of collective action and takings law.157 As to the latter,
for example, attention to community highlights the inadequacy of existing
jurisprudential categories of government takings. 158 To avoid the potential for
under-compensation, it is necessary to assess more critically the breadth of
relevant exercises of eminent domain and their potential to generate
"community externalities."' 159 Depending on the latter, just compensation may
be due even to property owners that a taking does not directly affect.
160
Beyond these particular areas, the dynamic at work in Cheshire - and in
cases where social norms, network effects, coordination dynamics, and
knowledge and information play an important role - also highlights a broader
point: it is essential for the law and economics literature to be far more
cautious than its methodological individualism has commonly caused it to be
in its analysis of individual consent.
Among individuals in Cheshire, as among those making the decision to
observe a social norm, to purchase a technology compatible with a dominant
network, to coordinate at a salient equilibrium, and the like, there is surely
consent at the most basic level. There is no element, thus, of what we would
think of as coercion. Consistent with ontological individualism, meanwhile, it
is clear that individuals are the relevant decision-makers, not communities or a
collectivity of some sort. 161
What is less clear, on the other hand, is what we should understand this
consent to signify. Minimally, our placement of normative weight on private
contracting choices may be unwarranted in such settings. The consent
manifest in Cheshire, in behavior consistent with prevailing social norms, and
in consumer preferences for the dominant PC network, rather than the Apple
alternative, thus may not constitute the robust signal that an individualistic law
and economics commonly sees in it.162 That individuals choose to sell their
homes in Cheshire or buy more PCs than Macs may not mean that those
outcomes are efficient. In settings of interdependence, rather, even non-
coerced choices may be more indicative of relevant social context than
individual will. 1
63
156 See id. at 126-27.
1 See id at 130-42.
158 See id. at 137-38.
9 See id. at 136-37.
160 See id at 134-39.
161 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
162 Stating the point differently, methodological individualism might be seen to
encourage too strong an emphasis on markets as mediating institutions. See Dau-Schmidt,
supra note 36, at 395.
163 As Marglin puts it, we need to be more attentive to the sometimes obscure line
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More directly to the point herein, as a matter of methodology, it is unclear
that indicia of consent are especially relevant to the analysis of settings of
interdependence. In Cheshire, thus, what happened turned on the impact of
community on individual residents' decisions to sell. The fact of individual
consent, as such, tells us little.
Most explicitly, one might see this point as relevant to our notions of
freedom of contract. In the setting of Cheshire, individuals chose to sell their
homes, free of coercion. Given as much, their decisions can plausibly be cast
as manifestations of the freedom of contract. Given the critical role of
community in shaping those decisions, on the other hand, such an account
would be woefully incomplete. Residents' nominal freedom of contract in
Cheshire thus may not tell us nearly as much as we think.
Methodological individualism's distortion of our analyses of consent
likewise implicate study of the firm. 164 Absent a rigidly individualistic
approach, one might more readily question contractarian notions of the firm.1
65
Minimally, though, a more complex account of consent would challenge the
normative claims of efficiency that a nexus of contracts approach posits.1
66
This, of course, was the critical insight Michael Klausner and Marcel Kahan
pressed in highlighting the potential for network externalities in the choice of
corporate charter terms.' 67 Given such network externalities, they argued, an
individual firm's selection of particular terms might or might not suggest their
efficiency. 68 Mere individual consent, once again, may tell us less than we
commonly think.
between constraint and coercion. See MARGLIN, supra note 15, at 70; see also Timothy L.
Fort & James J. Noone, Banded Contracts, Mediating Institutions, and Corporate
Governance: A Naturalist Analysis of Contractual Theories of the Firm, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1999, at 163,184.
"6 See Fort & Noone, supra note 163, at 165, 177-78.
165 We might likewise question conventional attitudes toward entity theories of the firm.
See Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1565, 1567-1612 (1993).
166 Cf Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 794 (1972); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937).
167 See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate'), 83 VA. L. REv. 713, 716 (1997);
Klausner, supra note 12, at 765. Incorporation or re-incorporation in Delaware may thus
have far less to do with individual choice and consent than with the surrounding social
context, and particularly its network characteristics.
168 The failure of Klausner's and Kahan's analysis to put any significant dent in the
corporate literature's continued reliance on nexus of contracts theories of the firm may
suggest the continued unwillingness of law and economics to integrate interdependence into
its analysis.
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B. Change and Evolution in Law and Economics
Beyond distortions in the implications we derive from consent, a further
consequence of methodological individualism in law and economics may be a
relative inattention to change, evolution, and dynamic effects more generally.
Law and economics has thus largely oriented itself to static analyses of one
sort or another. As Ronald Coase concisely states it, "the way we look at the
working of the economic system has been extraordinarily static .... ,,169
Others have echoed as much, highlighting law and economics' "focus[] on the
present" and weakness in "explain[ing] circumstances that change over
time," 170 and criticizing its use of "highly reductionist and static neoclassical
models that abstract severely from essential features of the human condition
and the social process."'
71
Consider, for example, the relative inattention of law and economics to
questions of where markets come from. Rather than analyze the latter, the
literature simply assumes the existence of markets, as something in the state of
nature. 172 As a result, important issues - including the role of law in
facilitating the emergence of markets, and potential distortions in the contours
of certain markets -have received inadequate attention.1
73
We might find further evidence of law and economics' failure to attend to
change in its assumption of static preferences. 74 We have already seen how
the discipline seeks to exogenize preference formation in the name of
methodological individualism. 175 The next step - to an assumption of fixed
preferences - follows naturally. Microeconomics' study of individual utility is
grounded in relevant preferences. If the discipline cannot speak to preference
formation, however, it becomes necessary for it to hold the preferences
constant. 17
6
169 Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 72, 73 (1998).
170 Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REv. 303,
323 n.118 (2005).
171 Gregory Scott Crespi, Exploring the Complicationist Gambit: An Austrian Approach
to the Economic Analysis of Law, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 315, 383 (1998). One might, in
fact, cast the entire emphasis of neoclassical economics on equilibrium along these lines.
See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
172 Ron Harris, The Encounters of Economic History and Legal History, 21 LAW & HIST.
REv. 297, 300 (2003) ("Markets were considered the natural state of things. They were
presumed to have always been there.").
173 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the
Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 280-81 (2003); Amitai
Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal Systems, 22
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 10 (2004).
174 See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 540.
175 See supra Part I.C.
176 Behavioral law and economics' notions of dynamic inconsistency, to be sure,
represent some challenge to the assumption of stable preferences. Even behavioral analysis,
however, remains committed to methodological individualism, see Rostain, supra note 24,
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An account of preferences as exogenous and fixed, however, leaves a great
deal on the cutting room floor. In many circumstances, preference formation is
the central question of interest. 177 In the study of network effects, for example,
the critical issue is how the consumption patterns of collectives shape the
preferences of individuals. 78 The orientation of the social choice literature to
the aggregation, rather than the shaping, of preferences might be understood in
a similar light. But for an insistent individualism, issues of preference
formation would seem like a natural focus for students of social choice.
179
To related effect is law and economics' inattention to the evolution of
norms.1 80 Notably, this has been true even of the social norms literature, which
has largely black-boxed questions of how norms change.18 ' Some have
explored these questions, to be sure - under the rubric of the "expressive"
functions of law and otherwise. 82  Yet one might have expected these
questions to have received far more attention than they have, given their direct
relevance to so much of what norms serve to accomplish.
Beyond the lack of attention to preference formation and norm change, law
and economics has also eschewed the focus on change implicit in historical
and evolutionary analysis. Douglass North - highlighting the need for
economists to study history - has suggested the nexus between history and
change: "The objective of research in the field [of economic history] is [to
provide] an analytical framework that will enable us to understand economic
change.
'183
This was not, however, the tradition of economic analysis on which law and
economics was built. Instead, law and economics emerged from what is
arguably the least historical - and most disconnected - strand of economic
theory: neoclassical economics. Law and economics emerged, thus, at the
at 973, and is static in its own ways, see Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government
Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1627 &
n.20 (2006). Other strands of economic analysis have also taken steps beyond the
assumption of static preferences, including certain work in institutional economics. Such
efforts, however, are - by a wide margin - the exception rather than the rule.
177 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 36, at 396.
178 See supra Part I.B.
179 See MARGLIN, supra note 15, at 69.
180 See Harris, supra note 172, at 332 ("Only rarely did law and economics scholars ask
how legal norms evolved.").
181 Cf Ellickson, supra note 2, at 550.
1812 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2022-24 (1996); see also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1, 37 ("[C]riminal
punishment is not merely the price of crime, but is also an expression of society's
condemnation of the criminal act ...."); Ellickson, supra note 2, at 550 (discussing relevant
work of Randy Picker in the context of coordination).
183 See Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
359, 359 (1994).
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lowest ebb in the discipline's attention to history, time, and change. 184 Perhaps
for this reason, law and economics' approach to history has often been
characterized by disinterest and dismissal.
185
To similar effect is the inattention of law and economics to evolutionary
dynamics, which - like the study of history - require analysis beyond the
individual. Notably, this inattention persists even in areas such as behavioral
law and economics, which would seem especially well-suited to evolutionary
analysis. I86  Such disregard, however, was hardly predestined. In its very
earliest iterations, law and economics was tied to the original, early Twentieth-
Century literature of institutional economics. 187  That original strand of
institutional economics, meanwhile, was highly evolutionary in its emphasis,
given the strong influence of Darwin's work on its founder, Thorstein
Veblen. 188 Modem law and economics, however, has emphatically disavowed
any link to this "old" institutional economics. 189
Even more striking may be the failure of law and economics to attend to the
evolutionary approach of Friedrich Hayek. 190 Hayek has been a mainstay of
the law and economics literature, commonly cited in support of the power of
markets, as well as a strong individualistic focus.191 Yet Hayek's analysis was
no less evolutionary in its orientation.
Hayek's application of theories of evolution to economics, moreover, did
not rely on the individual selection models that dominate evolutionary theory
today. 192 Hayek saw evolution as playing out in the selection behavior of
groups, rather than individuals. 93 Echoing as much, law and economics might
184 See Harris, supra note 172, at 331 ("Law and economics applied those parts of micro-
economic theory that were most ahistorical and static.").
185 See Harris, supra note 22, at 671-72.
186 See Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics,
64 MD. L. REV. 85, 101 (2005). The work of Jack Hirshleifer constitutes a particularly
prominent exception. See, e.g., Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and
Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies, 4 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 3-4 (1982).
187 See Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1027-28
(2002).
188 See Steven G. Medema et al., Institutional Law and Economics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 418, 421-22 (Boudewijn Bouckaert et al. eds., 2000).
189 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 427 (1995).
190 See F.A. HAYEK, KNOWLEDGE, EVOLUTION AND SOCIETY 7 (1983); HAYEK, supra note
34, at 72 (asserting that "rules of individual conduct have developed because the individuals
have been living in groups whose structures have gradually changed").
191 See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas
of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12-17 (2004) (summarizing
Hayek's numerous contributions to law and economics); Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B.
Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 561-563
(2008) (introducing an analysis of Hayek's impact on modem law and economics).
192 But see SOBER & WILSON, supra note 49.
193 See Zywicki & Sanders, supra note 191, at 579.
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do well not simply to attend to evolutionary change generally, but specifically
to change among groups. To do so, however, the discipline would need to
move beyond a continued insistence on methodological individualism.
To be sure, the law and economics literature has given some attention to
change, history, and evolution. But this treatment has been the exception
rather than the rule.194  This should not surprise us, however, given the
methodological individualism of the discipline. Given how little an
individualistic analysis can contribute to an understanding of the inherently
social dynamics of change, a methodologically individualist law and
economics simply does not have much to say about preference formation,
norm change, or historical and evolutionary analysis. 
195
Consider, again, the issue of preference formation: static preferences can
plausibly be seen as individual, rather than collective, in nature - i.e., not as a
product of "social utility" in some abstract sense. On the other hand, it seems
difficult to conceptualize the formation of preferences other than from a social
perspective. What we value, and how we value it, is quite commonly
collective in nature. To understand changes in preferences, then, attention to
social and institutional factors, to culture, and to history is essential. Little
wonder, then, that a methodologically individualist law and economics would
avoid the subject.
C. The Regulation of Knowledge and Information
Given the social nature of the generation and transfer of knowledge and
information, effective regulation in the area must attend to the collective and
institutional dynamics at work.196 Consider, for example, the particular
questions of trust that arise in the context of information goods. By
comparison with other goods, the value of information goods depends heavily
on trust - in its source, in its quality, and so on. The result is a heightened
scope of uncertainty, the resolution of which - as described above - is
194 Some law and economics scholars, for example, have engaged in close historical
analysis. See Daniel M. Klerman, Statistical and Economic Approaches to Legal History,
2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1167, 1168-70 (reviewing relevant work). One might also note
relevant work on path dependence in this vein. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution
in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 641 (1996). The most significant
exception, however, is the early law and economics literature's exploration of the efficiency
of the common law. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 205, 210-11 (1982). This body of work was all about history and evolution. By the
account of most historians, however, it was not particularly good history. See Harris, supra
note 22, at 669-70. More importantly, it was directed to a distinctly narrow species of
change. Id.
195 See MARGLIN, supra note 15, at 68 ("[T]he process of change is a social process ...
196 See supra Part l.D.
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necessarily social in nature. 197 Any regulatory regime directed to information
goods must recognize as much.
The public goods and network qualities of knowledge and information
likewise dictate a more social orientation in relevant regulation. Information is
non-rival and non-excludable, like other public goods.198 At the extreme, it
exhibits the peculiar characteristics of a zero marginal cost good.' 99 Scarcity,
as a result, looms less large in the production and consumption of knowledge
and information, allowing - and even inviting - more collective modes of
analysis. 200 Network dimensions are likewise in evidence, especially where
relevant knowledge or information is standards-based. Standards, like norms,
are essentially defined by their social character and necessarily must be
approached as such.20 1  A regulatory regime engaged only with the
individualistic dimensions of relevant standards thus overlooks a great deal of
the dynamic at work.
20 2
Yochai Benkler taps into just these challenges in his criticism of prevailing
approaches to information regulation. 20 3 Where wealth takes the form of
knowledge and is socially produced, Benkler suggests, caution is required in
the design of operative regulation. Regulators must take care to ensure that
their efforts to insulate particular spheres, or to discriminate among potential
participants in collective endeavors, do not undermine the social dynamics at
work.20 4 Given the rapid pace of change, meanwhile, a "wait and see"
approach may be in order, minimally to avoid the abuse of public interventions
to advance private interests, and more generally given still-high levels of
uncertainty in relevant settings.20 5 Finally, regulators must resist attempts to
leverage copyright to limit innovation in emerging network settings.
20 6
Julie Cohen likewise critiques our individualistic approach to knowledge
and information in the context of copyright, pointing to distortions that may
19' See supra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
198 See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1749
(1996).
19 See Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 2083, 2116 (2009).
200 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 99-106 (2006).
201 Cf Cohen, supra note 118, at 1818.
202 An individualistic focus may also help explain the lack of regulation in certain
information-driven spheres, including the internet. See Philip J. Weiser, The Future of
Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 532-35 (2009).
203 See BENKLER, supra note 200, at 439-44.
204 See id. at 383-85. One might recall, in this vein, Arrow's concerns about the
distortions attendant to an individualistic approach to knowledge. See Arrow, supra note 1,
at 6-7.
205 See BENKLER, supra note 200, at 26-27.
206 See id. at 439-41.
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arise from an inattention to the dynamic patterns at work.20 7 Law and
economics' preference for a static approach, directed to the analysis of
"isolated goods at a particular point in time," is thus "especially perverse" "as
applied to information goods. '20 8 Copyright law must attend to the dynamic
consequences of relevant rules as well, if it is to manage the pattern of positive
feedback that arises where "exposure to information shapes demand for
additional information," and if it is to appreciate the implications of
institutional design generally for information production.
20 9
D. Crisis and Coordination in the Financial Markets
A final area in which one might observe distortions attendant to
methodological individualism is the realm of financial regulation. In
understanding aspects of the financial markets - and in the design of relevant
regulation - the necessary approach may often be more collective than
individual. Consider, by way of example, the recent financial crisis.
There has been much discussion of the causes of the crisis. 210 For the most
part, however, this analysis has failed to focus on its central feature: the
collective dynamics that lie behind the emergence - and the potential
avoidance - of financial crises. The pattern at work in financial crises,
properly understood, is one of multiple equilibria.21 The classic bank run
helps to highlight as much.
In a bank run, crisis arises from the abrupt demand for withdrawals by a
bank's depositors. Given the fractional reserve rules on which the banking
system relies2 12 - under which capital reserves constitute only a small
proportion of a bank's outstanding obligations - such withdrawal demands
cannot be met, even by well-capitalized, healthy banks. They are quickly
driven, as a consequence, into bankruptcy.
2 13
Seeking to model this phenomenon, Douglas Diamond and Phillip Dybvig
identified the critical characteristic of banking - and of bank runs - as the
presence of multiple equilibria.214 In the superior equilibrium, depositors place
207 See Cohen, supra note 118, at 1818.
208 See id at 1817.
209 Id. at 1817-18.
210 Compare Catherine Rampell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, Bernanke Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at Al, with Floyd Norris, It May Be Outrageous, But Wall Street Pay
Didn't Cause This Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at B 1.
211 See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
212 See Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of the
Insurance Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 647 n.22 (1993).
213 See Robert F. Kornegay, Jr., Bank Loans as Securities: A Legal and Financial
Economic Analysis of the Treatment of Marketable Bank Assets Under the Securities Acts,
40 UCLA L. REV. 799, 816 n.50 (1993).
214 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 402 (1983) ("This vulnerability occurs because there are
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their funds with the bank, confident in their ability to withdraw on whatever
future date they can make optimal use of the funds - allowing others to
withdraw at earlier optimal dates and generating an efficient distribution of
risk.215 In the inferior equilibrium, by contrast, confidence is undermined,
causing all depositors to seek immediate (and sub-optimal) withdrawal of their
assets - and thereby breaking the bank.216 The essential dynamic of the
banking system, then, is one in which coordination of depositors around a
superior equilibrium generates optimal returns, while coordination around an
inferior equilibrium brings financial ruin.
This multiple equilibrium dynamic is not unique, however, to banking.
Rather, it plays out across the financial markets generally.217 Coordination is
thus central to the operation of the modem financial markets. 218 The benefits
of a particular investment or trading system to a given individual are closely
tied to its attraction to others. Variously framed analyses of "strategic
complementarities," 219 "systemic risk,"220 and "herd behavior 221 in the
financial markets bespeak, at root, their multiple equilibrium character. Where
strategic complementarities are observed, for example, financial markets can
be expected to operate like the banking system - with depositors collectively
settling on either the equilibrium of maintaining deposits or of withdrawing
them, based on their expectations of one another.222 To similar effect, outside
multiple equilibria with differing levels of confidence.").
215 See id
216 See id. at 403.
217 See Ahdieh, supra note 89, at 217-21; Russell Cooper & Andrew John, Coordinating
Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models, 103 Q.J. ECON. 441, 447 (1988) (highlighting
"the connection between strategic complementarity and multiplicity of equilibria"); Paul R.
Masson, Multiple Equilibria, Contagion, and the Emerging Market Crises 5 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/99/164, 1999) (identifying distinct accounts of multiple
equilibria in financial markets); see also id. at 3 ("[M]odels with multiple equilibria ...
square better with the stylized facts of global financial markets.").
218 See Masson, supra note 217, at 6 ("[I]f each bank believes that all other banks will
stop lending, all banks will stop lending." (quoting Jeffrey Sachs, Theoretical Issues in
International Borrowing, in PRINCETON STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE No. 54, at 32
(July 1984))).
219 See Cooper & John, supra note 217, at 447.
220 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 194 (2008).
221 See Christopher Avery & Peter Zemsky, Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd
Behavior in Financial Markets, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 724, 724 (1998); cf Paul Krugman, A
Model of Balance-of-Payment Crises, 11 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 311, 314-15 (1979)
(analyzing conditions for equilibrium in balance-of-payment crises). The analysis of
network effects in the financial markets might also be included in this litany. See, e.g.,
Ahdieh, supra note 89, at 273-84.
222 See Cooper & John, supra note 217, at 447; see also Satyajit Chatterjee et al.,
Strategic Complementarity in Business Formation: Aggregate Fluctuations and Sunspot
Equilibria, 60 REv. ECON. STUD. 795, 809 (1993).
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the bank run context, banks will tend to lend or refuse to lend as a group;
hedge funds and private equity firms will hold back or aggressively compete
for investment opportunities in tandem. Herd behavior operates similarly, with
the pack moving either to a high-level or low-level equilibrium, depending on
expectations.
223
An approach to financial crises grounded in the analysis of individuals is
likely, as a result, to lead us astray. Most simply, it may do so given the
relative under-emphasis of individual-oriented regulation on change - and the
centrality of change (and rapid change) to financial crises.224 Even more
fundamental an issue, however, is the inability of an individualistic approach to
grapple with the multiple equilibrium dynamic at work, 225 and the consequent
prospect that relevant law and regulation may downplay that dynamic. An
individualistic approach may thus cause us to miss the essence of the process at
work.
Within a multiple equilibrium approach to the financial markets, we have
seen, crises occur when the market moves - necessarily abruptly - from a
high-level to a low-level equilibrium of lending, investment, and spending.
Banks refuse to lend.2 26 The market for credit default swaps disappears.
227
Private equity investment dries up.228 And we find ourselves exactly where we
were amidst the recent financial crisis. Why exactly do banks, traders, private
equity firms, and others do this? Because their decision-making is
fundamentally social in nature. In the emergence of a crisis, each bank, trader,
and private equity firm determines that they expect other individuals and
institutions to cut back their lending, investing, and spending. Given the
multiple equilibrium dimension to their returns, in turn, they elect to do so as
well.
The immediate cause of the recent financial crisis, then, was not any of the
many culprits we have since targeted, including subprime lending, excessive
risk-taking, the housing bubble, and the like.229 Rather, it is the shift in
collective expectations from a high-level to a low-level equilibrium of lending,
investment, and spending. The solution to financial crises, in turn, lies in
223 See supra note 221. Herd behavior arises from the tendency of investors to follow
market trends, and consequently to overvalue or undervalue relevant assets. See Schwarcz,
supra note 220, at 217; see also Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107
Q.J. ECON. 797, 798 (1992).
224 See supra Part III.B.
225 See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
226 See Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Offers Wall St. Banks New Loans to Ease Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, at Al.
227 See Serena Ng, Credit-Default Market Freezes as Risk Grows, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19,
2008, at C3.
228 See Phil Craig, Party is Over for Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2009, at C3.
229 See supra note 2 10 and accompanying text.
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shaping collective expectations to the contrary. As to this critical endeavor,
however, individual analysis does not tell us very much.
The methodological individualism of law and economics may thus variously
distort our analysis of consent, diminish our attention to change, and misdirect
our approach to the regulation of information and the financial markets.
Significant as they are, moreover, these are simply examples of the potential
consequences of an individualistic approach. In their emphasis on both
individuals and community, Parchomovsky and Siegelman suggest yet other
potential implications - for environmental and tort law, for our approach to
takings, and for our understanding of collective action.230 Methodological
individualism may also cause us to pay inadequate attention to the hierarchical
dynamics created by legal relationships within the firm, and hence to reach
flawed conclusions as the need for mandatory fiduciary duties, limits on
executive compensation, and the like.2 31 Yet further consequences of law and
economics' methodological individualism, finally, might be the potential to
overestimate the role of the law,2 32 to focus too strongly on Pareto
optimality, 33 and to favor less complex accounts of valuation.23 4 It becomes
clear, then, that if we are to engage fully with important - and perhaps
increasingly important - areas of legal and economic analysis, we must move
beyond the rote methodological individualism on which law and economics
has traditionally relied.
CONCLUSION
It bears emphasizing, by way of conclusion, that the foregoing is not
intended to dispute the significant benefits of methodological individualism.
At a minimum, methodological individualism discourages descriptive
ambiguity and helps to generate more readily testable propositions. By
comparison with methodological holism, it may also help us avoid overlooking
important facets of particular social and economic interactions.
235
230 See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 19, at 124-42.
231 See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 265, 266-67, 270 (1998). Beyond the substantive distortions enumerated above,
a persistent methodological individualism may also have important scholarly consequences,
including inadequate attention to some of phenomena described above, and a failure to
appreciate the important connections among them.
232 See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 19, at 82, 108.
233 See Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1987, 1991 (1996).
234 This is the pattern at work, for example, where the importance of network effects is
downplayed. See, e.g., supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text.
235 Elster grounds his argument in favor of methodological individualism - and his
rejection of Marxist class analysis - in just this concern. See Elster, supra note 51, at 453-
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As we have seen, however, methodological individualism has equally
significant limits. On its own, it is not sustainable as an analytical method. As
Kenneth Arrow observed, criticizing his fellow economists' methodological
individualism, "every economic model one can think of includes irreducibly
social principles and concepts." 236 This result does not, moreover, turn on the
inadequacy of the given models. Rather, it is an unavoidable consequence of
the analysis. As Arrow concludes: "[I]ndividual behavior is always mediated
by social relations. These are as much part of the description of reality as is
individual behavior."
237
Methodological individualism's mere aggregation of individual utilities,
meanwhile, misses too much, in too many areas.238 As Lars Udehn puts it:
"Social structure takes the form of a set of interdependent positions that are
prior to the interaction between the individuals occupying these positions....
[T]his means that to talk about 'aggregation' is misleading: 'for the phenomena
to be explained involve interdependence of individuals' actions, not merely
aggregated individual behavior.' 239 In important areas of social and economic
interaction, thus, the whole really is more than the sum of its parts.
Given as much, an effective methodology must integrate both individualistic
analysis and attention to relevant social, collective, and institutional factors.
240
As Timothy Fort and James Noone emphasize, an account in which "economic
action is the determined result of social kinship patterns . . . provides an
oversocialized view of human nature, while [an] atomized view provides an
undersocialized view. Instead, persons have a dual nature: We both are
constrained and informed by our communitarian norms and retain an ability to
transcend that community. ' 241 Some "duality" of explanation is consequently
required.
242
54, 468. Methodological individualism may also have deeper analytical benefits, however,
including focusing our attention on the actual place where human experience occurs. See
Rubin, supra note 41, at 1717.
236 Arrow, supra note 1, at 2.
237 Id. at 5.
238 Contrary to individualistic accounts, thus, it is not the case that "once the appropriate
signals are given, individuals behave in isolation and the result of their behaviour may
simply be added together." See Kirman, supra note 119, at 137. In a related vein, one
might note Kirman's reliance on the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem to critique the
project of aggregation - and of macroeconomics - more generally. See Alan P. Kirman,
Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent?, J. EcON. PERSP., Spring
1992, at 117, 121-22.
239 Udehn, supra note 28, at 494 (quoting COLEMAN, supra note 65, at 22).
240 Cf JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 6 (2007).
241 Fort & Noone, supra note 163, at 185; see also Andrew J. Cappel, Bringing Cultural
Practice Into Law: Ritual and Social Norms Jurisprudence, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 389,
394 n.10 (2003) ("Indeed, too sharp a dichotomy between methodological individualism and
holism appears problematic under careful analysis .... [W]hat needs to be explained is the
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The critical project for law and economics, then, is to develop an approach
that captures the individual in her social context. In attempting as much, we
might take our cue from others' efforts in this vein. Most familiarly, we might
see this as the place where Hayek ultimately found himself - "replac[ing] his
customary methodological individualism with a group theory approach, as he
attempted to shed some light on the evolution of systems of rules of
conduct. '243 Hayek's analysis was thus individualistic, yet also institutional, in
that it recognized the potential for social and institutional factors to play a
causal role.
244
The evolutionary selection of rules of individual conduct [was], in
Hayek's view, a process that operates not through individual action but
'through the viability of the [group] order it will produce . ... ' [T]he
relationship between the parts that form a group, and which are therefore
essential to the existence of the group as a whole, cannot be fully
explained by the mere interaction between the parts.
245
Given Hayek's prominent place in law and economics - including because
of his strong individualism - his perspective may offer particularly useful
inspiration for a shift beyond methodological individualism. We might also
gain insight from other sources, however, including the work of James
Coleman, who sought to bridge the holistic approach of sociology with the
methodological individualism of economics.
246
In Coleman's framework diagrams, thus, there is recognition of the critical
place of individual preferences in determining individual behavior, as well as
the role of individual behavior in shaping social outcomes. 247 There is equal
recognition, however, of the important role of social context in shaping
preferences, and even of its role in defining the framework within which
individual behaviors combine and interact to produce social outcomes of
interest.
complex interrelationship between the two.").
242 See Hodgson, supra note 9, at 222. As Arrow puts it: "I have emphasized the
desirability of an individualist perspective. I now want to argue that economic theories
require social elements as well even under the strictest acceptance of standard economic
assumptions." Arrow, supra note 1, at 4.
243 Amstutz, supra note 34, at 468-69.
244 See Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 391,
436 n.142 (1997).
245 Amstutz, supra note 34, at 469 (citations omitted) (quoting HAYEK, supra note 34, at
68).
246 See COLEMAN, supra note 65; see also Ellickson, supra note 2, at 542. Wider
attention to Akerlof and Kranton's identity economics, see supra note 21 and accompanying
text, would also be in order. See KAUSHIK BASU, PRELUDE TO POLITICAL ECONOMY: A
STUDY OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICs 255-56 (2000).
247 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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With such a framework, there is no insistence on starting with - or reifying
the place of - individuals in the analysis. Quite obviously, individuals are
central to the method. But there is no less a role for social and institutional
elements, in seeking to understand relevant social and economic phenomena.
With such an approach, law and economics would continue to attend to the
individual, but would be attentive to her context as well.
